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Purpose: Integrated reporting is a process founded on 
integrated thinking, with the aim of  issuing periodic integrated 
reports by firms about value creation over time. This study 
investigates the effect of  board attributes (independence, 
diligence, and size) on the quality of  integrated reporting of  
Nigerian listed oil and gas firms.  
Design/Methodology: Panel data are obtained from annual 
reports of  a purposive sample of  10 out of  the 12 listed Oil 
and Gas firms in Nigeria from 2013 to 2017. These are 
analyzed using multiple regression techniques, via STATA 13.0 
software.  
Results: Based on the analysis conducted, findings show that 
the board independence and board size have a significant and 
positive effect, while board diligence has an insignificant and 
positive effect on the quality of  integrated reporting, proxied 
by integrated reporting disclosure score (IRDSCORE). This 
outcome implies that having the optimum mix of  members on 
the board influences the extent of  integrated disclosures of  
listed oil and gas firms in Nigeria.  
Practical Implications: Global corporate reporting is 
currently driving towards integrated thinking, incorporating 
financial, governance, social and environmental issues to 
promote long-term value creation. As a third world nation, the 
adoption of  integrated reports is voluntary in Nigeria. 
However, considering the information needs of  all 
stakeholders and appointing qualified persons on the board by 
shareholders, and formulating enabling policies in this direction 
by regulatory agencies would drive corporate reporting to be 
more integrative to drive long-term value maximization. 
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Introduction 
The preparation and publication of financial statements have been the basic way through which management 
communicates business activities to owners and other stakeholders. However, these statements were not 
integrated such that they failed to report how environmental and social activities may affect the performance 
of the firm. Consequently, in 2011, the International Integrated Reporting Council, which is a global body 
formed by regulators, investors, companies, standard-setting bodies, accountants and non-governmental 
organizations, launched a pilot program regarding the issuance of integrated reports. The Council aimed at 
the development of a framework for integrated reporting (IR Framework) based on the feedback from those 
actors that were affected by the shortcomings of the financial statements. As a result, corporate reporting 
shifted from the mere presentation of financial statements to the integration of financial statements, 
management commentary, governance issues, environmental concerns and remuneration reporting (The 
International Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC), 2013).  
Integrated reporting attempts to merge financial and non-financial information, developing the integrated 
thinking, underlying the interdependencies between them, improving the quality of information, and 
identifying the material issues that affect the business, which lead to a better allocation of resources. All these 
elements support decision making and actions that are focused on value creation over the short, medium, and 
long runs (Hurghis, 2017). According to (Hurghis (2017), integrated reporting suffers the challenge of lack of 
interconnectivity and clear identification of the nexus between most of the content elements of the IR 
Framework and performance of firms. In spite of this challenge, integrated reporting has been considered as a 
process founded on integrated thinking, with the purpose to ensure the issuance of periodic integrated reports 
by organizations about value creation over time. As a result, the IIRC is looking forward to changing the face 
of corporate reporting.  
The board of directors, pursuing the goal of wealth maximization on behalf of the shareholders, are duty 
bound to ensure adequate communication of all activities relating to shareholders’ investments (Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC), 2016; Basuony & Mohamed, 2014; Huafang & Jianguo, 2007). Thus, the board 
has to maintain a comprehensive and cost-efficient communication channel for disseminating relevant 
information, including material non-financial and sustainability reports, which are crucial for informed 
decision-making by investors, stakeholders and other interested users. This is aimed at reducing information 
asymmetry between the board and other stakeholders (Beck, Campbell, & Shrives, 2010; Chen & Jaggi, 2000).  
Currently, integrated reporting is a voluntary disclosure, except for firms listed on the floor of the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange in South Africa (Hurghis, 2017). Consequently, the question lies in whether 
issuing integrated reports by firms would be affected by certain attributes of the board of directors. 
Therefore, this paper investigates the effect of board attributes on the extent of integrated disclosure of listed 
Oil and Gas firms in Nigeria. Specific objectives of the paper include: (i) To investigate the effect of board 
independence on the quality of integrated reporting of listed Oil and Gas firms in Nigeria based on the IIRC 
IR Framework; (ii) To ascertain the effect of board diligence on the quality of integrated reporting of listed 
Oil and Gas firms in Nigeria based on the IIRC IR Framework; and (iii) To assess the effect of board size on 
the extent of integrated reporting of listed Oil and Gas firms in Nigeria in relation to the IIRC IR Framework. 
Sequel to the objectives stated the following hypotheses are formulated: 
Ho1: Board independence has no significant effect on the quality of IR of listed Oil and Gas firms in 
 Nigeria;  
Ho2: Board diligence has no significant effect on the quality of IR of listed Oil and Gas firms in Nigeria; 
 and 
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Ho3: Board size has no significant effect on the quality of IR of listed Oil and Gas firms in Nigeria. 
The statutory responsibility of communicating the activities of an organization to its principal (shareholders) 
lies with the agent (board of directors). However, disclosing information adjudged to be voluntary is at the 
mercy of the board. Thus, considering the dimension of global corporate reporting, the outcome of this study 
would expose the importance of integrated reporting as well as the role the board to shareholders, which 
would guide them in the choice of members to constitute the board of directors. In addition, the outcome of 
this study is significant to regulatory agencies such as the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) and the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) in their bid to formulating policies to regulate and set limits to what 
constitute voluntary disclosures, thus encouraging integrated reporting. Furthermore, the outcome of this 
study would add to the body of knowledge on the subject matter, and serve as a reference tool to research 
students and academics for further research. 
The paper is structured into five sections, the first of which is this introduction. Section two presents the 
literature review, while section three contains the methodology. Finally, sections four and five present the 
results and discussion as well as conclusion and recommendations respectively.  
Literature Review 
Integrated reporting refers to the system of reporting that combines both financial and non-financial 
information in the report. Integrated reporting develops the integrated thinking underlying the 
interdependencies between financial and non-financial information thus, improving the quality of information 
and identifying the material issues that affect the business, which will lead to a better allocation of resources 
to enhance value creation over time (Gokten & Gokten, 2017; Hurghis, 2017). Integrated thinking considers 
the connectivity and interdependencies among a range of factors that affect the ability of the firm to create 
value over time. These factors include: the capitals that the firm uses or affects and the critical 
interdependency, including trade-offs between them; the capacity of the firm to respond to key stakeholders’ 
legitimate needs and interests; how the firm develops its business model and strategy to respond to its 
external environment and the risks and opportunities it faces; and the firm’s activities, performance and 
outcomes in terms of the past, present and future capitals (The International Integrated Reporting Council 
(IIRC), 2013). The contents of the Integrated Reporting Framework as developed by the IIRC is classified 
into guiding principles and the content elements. The guiding principles include strategic focus and future 
orientation; connectivity of information; stakeholder relationship; materiality; conciseness; reliability and 
completeness; and consistency and comparability. While the content elements include: firm’s overview and 
external environment; governance; business model; risk and opportunities; strategy and resource allocation; 
performance; outlook; and the basis of preparation and presentation (Schorger & Sewchurran, 2015; 
Kocmanova & Docekalova, 2012). 
The International Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC) (2013) opines that adopting integrated reporting will 
benefit the firm by improving the quality of information available to providers of financial capital to enable a 
more efficient and productive allocation of capital; promoting a more cohesive and efficient approach to 
corporate reporting that draws on different reporting strands and communicating the full range of factors that 
materially affect the ability of the firm to create value over time; enhancing accountability and stewardship for 
the broad base of financial, manufactured, intellectual, human, social and natural capitals and promoting the 
understanding of their connectivity; and supporting integrated thinking, decision making and actions that are 
geared towards value creation over the short, medium or long terms. Consequently, to ensure a global 
acceptability and adoption of integrated reporting, the IIRC collaborated with the Carbon Disclosure Project 
(CDP), Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), IFRS Foundation, International Federation of Accountants 
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(IFAC), Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB) and the World Business Council for Sustainable 
Development (WBCSD) (Hurghis, 2017; Ruiz-Lozano & Tirado-Valencia, 2016). 
The board of directors is typically the governing body of the organization; whose primary responsibility is to 
ensure that the organization achieves the shareholders’ goal of value maximization (Ienciu, 2012; Mallin & 
Michelon, 2011). According to Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) (2016), the board of directors is 
composed of executive and non-executive directors, of which at least one of the non-executive directors must 
be an independent person. In their role of maximizing shareholders’ wealth, it is the duty of the board of 
directors to ensure that material and reportable non-financial and sustainability issues are disclosed. The level 
of disclosure is a strategic decision made by the board of directors (Rachagan, 2010; Patelli & Prencipe, 2007) 
thus, large board sizes could lead to more effective monitoring and reduce the opportunistic behavior by 
managers, which may prevent the withholding of information by management, especially voluntary 
disclosures. It has been argued that a greater number of directors on the board may reduce the likelihood of 
information asymmetry (Rouf, 2016; Chen & Jaggi, 2000). In addition, Akhtaruddin and Rouf (2012) argue 
that non-executive directors are needed on the board to monitor and control the actions of executive 
directors, who may engage in opportunistic behavior and also ensure that managers are working in the best 
interest of the principal.  Cheng and Courtenay (2006) believe that a larger proportion of non-executive 
directors on the board would induce executive directors to disclosures more material non-financial and 
voluntary issues, which integrated reporting is inclusive.  
Theoretical Framework 
Theories that best explains the relationship between board composition and integrated disclosures include the 
agency theory, stakeholders’ theory, signal theory, and legitimacy theory. The agency theory is a supposition 
that explains the relationship between principals (shareholders) and the agents (directors) in a firm. The 
shareholders employ directors to perform tasks on their behalf and thus, the directors are accountable to the 
shareholders and are required to render their reports at the end of the financial year. These reports are 
expected to include material non-financial and sustainability issues that are necessary enough to facilitate 
investors’ decision making. Although the IR framework is a voluntary disclosure, its disclosure would change 
the behavior of shareholders and investors or reduce the information asymmetry between them and the 
management (Roxana-Loana & Petru, 2017). The stakeholders’ theory is similar to the agency theory except 
that it incorporates the interest of all stakeholders rather than only shareholders. This shows that the directors 
owe every stakeholder the duty of making comprehensive information available for decision-making 
purposes, not only to investors (Eccles, Krzus, & Watson, 2011). In addition, the signal theory suggests that 
disclosing social and environmental issues convey a signal that they are engaged in proactive environmental 
strategy as they are incentivized to inform shareholders and other stakeholders by voluntarily disclosing more 
(Bakar, Sheikh, & Ameer, 2011). Therefore, these positive signals make companies more appealing to 
investors in the stock market. Moreover, according to the legitimacy theory, corporate social reporting 
provides information that legitimizes company’s behavior with the aim to influence stakeholders’ and 
eventually society’s perceptions about the company (Hooghiemstra, 2000), resulting to higher firm value 
(Ortas, Gallego-Alvarez, & Alvarez, 2015).  
Thus, the study adopts the stakeholders’ and signaling theories because the duty of the board of directors to 
disclose material non-financial and/or environmental and social information about the firm is not only to 
send a signal to shareholders but it is meant to feed all stakeholders with the material information that would 
facilitate their decision making. As a result, the ability of the board to disclose adequate financial and non-
financial information would help reduce the information asymmetry between the board and other 
stakeholders of the firm. 
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Review of Empirical Studies 
There are a number of empirical studies relating to integrated reporting and board composition.  Cheng and 
Courtenay (2006) analyze the association between board monitoring and the level of voluntary disclosures of 
the sample of 104 listed companies on the Singapore Stock Exchange for the year 2000. The study focused on 
the proportion of independent non-executive directors, the board size, and whether or not the same person 
doubles as the CEO and chairman of the board. The study found a significant and positive association 
between the proportion of independent non-executive directors and voluntary disclosures, while board size 
and CEO duality have no correlation with voluntary disclosures. This implies that as more independent non-
executive directors are admitted on the board of the companies, they turned to disclose more voluntary 
information.  
Lim, Matoksy, and Chow (2007) examine the association between board composition and different types of 
voluntary disclosure of the sample of 181 Australian top 500 companies for the year 2001, using the 
correlation technique. The study finds a positive and significant correlation between the proportion of 
independent directors and total voluntary disclosures of the companies, while the structure of the board is 
found not to influence the voluntary disclosure of financial and non-financial information. This result 
indicates that boards composed largely of independent directors voluntarily disclose more forward-looking 
quantitative and strategic information. 
Brammer and Pavelin (2008) study the relationship between the proportion of non-executive directors and 
the quality of voluntary environmental disclosures of the sample of 447 firms representing 64% of the FTSE 
All-Share index for a two-year period from 1999 to 2000. The study finds a negative but significant 
correlation, meaning that the higher the proportion of non-executive directors, the higher the tendency of not 
disclosing environmental information. In the same vein, Arshad, Darus, and Taylor (2008) examine the effects 
of board composition and mimetic behavior on the extent and credibility of corporate voluntary disclosure. 
The study is based on the annual reports of 155 Malaysian listed companies, at the end of 2002, during which 
these companies faced new corporate governance regulation. The study found an insignificant relationship 
between independent non-executive directors and the volume of voluntary disclosures, among other findings. 
It provides evidence that under the influence of dominant owners on board, management voluntary 
disclosure decisions are driven by incentives to confirm when their company is structured to meet 
expectations of good corporate governance. Such incentive seems to override incentives to disclose valuable 
information to outside investors. 
Villiers, Naiker, and Van-Staden (2011) examine the relationship between corporate environmental 
performance and board characteristics of the sample of 1,216 companies from the KLD database from the 
USA from 2003 to 2004. The study finds a direct correlation between independent directors as well as board 
size with environmental performance. This implies that companies with a higher number of independent 
directors and a larger board turned to have higher environmental performance. 
Akhtaruddin and Rouf (2012) examine the relationship between corporate governance, cultural factors, and 
voluntary disclosure by the listed companies in Bangladesh. The corporate governance factors examined are 
the proportion of independent non-executive directors, board leadership structure, management ownership, 
board size, and audit committee size. The extent of voluntary disclosure level is measured using 68 items of 
information. Data are taken from annual reports of the companies listed on the Dhaka Stock Exchange in 
Bangladesh for the year 2006. The result shows a positive association between board size, board leadership 
structure, audit committee size and voluntary disclosure. However, the study found no evidence to support 
the contention that independent directors are associated with increased disclosure, consistent with previous 
studies. Higher education of the CEO and CFO is positively related to the level of voluntary disclosure. The 
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result also indicates that the extent of voluntary disclosures is negatively associated with higher management 
ownership.  
Nandi and Ghosh (2013) investigate the association between firm characteristics, corporate governance 
attributes and the level of corporate disclosure of listed firms in India from 2000/2001 to 2009/2010. The 
study is based on the sample of 60 firms listed in the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE)/National Stock 
Exchange (NSE) during the study period and the Standard and Poor (2008) model for measuring the level of 
corporate disclosure is adopted. The multiple regression model is used for analysis and the study found a 
positive relationship between board size, the ratio of audit committee members to total board members, 
family control, CEO duality, firm size, profitability, liquidity and the extent of corporate disclosure. However, 
the degree of corporate disclosure is negatively related to board composition, leverage, and age of the firm.  
Ghabayen, Mohamad, and Ahmad (2016) examine the relationship between board characteristics and the level 
of corporate social responsibility disclosure (CSRD) in the Jordanian banking sector, using the sample of 147 
banks/years during a period of 10 years from 2004 to 2013. A checklist consisting of 100 items is developed 
to measure the disclosure level and the result indicates a relatively low level of disclosure in Jordanian banks. 
Multiple regression analysis is employed to examine the developed hypotheses. The results indicated that the 
larger board size and a higher level of the disclosure are correlated. However, low level of disclosure is 
associated with a higher proportion of independent directors and institutional directors. In addition, the 
female director is found to negatively affect the level of disclosure. This study has filled some of the previous 
studies’ gaps; the study is conducted in a new business environment. Besides, previous CSRD’s studies have 
not considered some of the board characteristics such as institutional directors. Thus this study investigates 
their impacts on the level of CSRD. In addition, this study provides some guidelines for future works. 
Furthermore, the findings of this study might be interested in several groups of shareholders and stakeholders 
such as government, regulators, potential investors, and CSR agencies.       
Rouf (2016) investigates the relationship between board diversity and corporate voluntary disclosures of the 
sample of 106 listed non-financial companies in Dhaka Stock Exchanges (DSE) from the period 2007-2011. 
Using the ordinary least squares regression technique and an unweighted relative disclosure index for 
measuring voluntary disclosure, the empirical results indicate that the percentage of female directors (PFD), 
board leadership structure (BLS) and total assets (TA) are positively associated with corporate voluntary 
disclosure. However, the study found the extent of corporate voluntary disclosure to be negatively associated 
with the percentage of equity owned by the insiders to all equity of the firms’ higher management ownership.   
Hurghis (2017) investigates the relationship between integrated reporting and board features of 7 North 
American firms, 5 South American firms, 49 firms in Europe, 11 African firms, 13 firms from Asia, and 4 
Australasia firms for a four-year period from 2012 to 2015 using the integrated reporting framework (IR 
Framework). The study finds a direct but weak correlation between board size and the disclosure index for 
integrated reporting, meaning that the bigger the size of the board, the more the discloses the content 
elements of the IR framework. On the contrary, the percentage of independent non-executive directors, CEO 
gender, CEO duality and CEO change during the year exhibit no correlation with the disclosure index, which 
shows that rising IR does not depend on the presence of independent non-executive directors, CEO gender, 
CEO duality and CEO change during the year. 
These studies report mixed findings in the relationship between board attributes and corporate voluntary 
and/or integrated disclosures at different times and locations. For instance, Cheng and Courtenay (2006), Lim 
et al. (2007), and Brammer and Pavelin (2008) report an insignificant relationship between board size and 
voluntary disclosures, while that between independent non-executive directors and voluntary disclosures are 
seen to be significant. On the contrary, Hurghis (2017) found a direct but weak correlation between board 
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size and integrated reporting disclosure index with that of independent non-executive directors is reported as 
insignificant. Amidst these mixed findings, the work of Hurghis (2017) is most related to the current study. 
However, his study establishes a link between integrated disclosures and board features but covers the period 
from 2012 to 2015, which is earlier than the IIRC IR framework, which was issued in 2013. In addition, 
Hurghis (2017) fails to incorporate board diligence as a proxy for board features. Thus, the current study fills 
this gap by extending the study to cover up to 2017, commencing in 2013 immediately after the IR framework 
was released as well as the inclusion of board diligence measured in terms of the number of meetings held by 
the board during the period to determine consistency or otherwise with previous studies. In addition, the 
choice of the oil and gas industry in Nigeria in pertinent because no previous study of this nature has been 
done on the industry.  
Design/Methodology 
The study adopts an ex-post facto research design. Thus, descriptive statistics, correlation, and multiple 
regression techniques are used for data analysis. The population of the study comprises the 12 Oil and Gas 
firms listed on the floor of the Nigerian Stock Exchange as at 31st December 2017 (see Appendix A). The 
study uses a purposive sampling technique with the intention of selecting all Oil and Gas firms that engage in 
environmental pollution and degradation activities that is the exploration and production of petroleum 
products as well as the manufacturing of by-products such as lubricants and greases, which requires them to 
engage in integrated reporting. Therefore, RAK Unity Petroleum Company Plc is eliminated Anino 
International Plc is eliminated on the basis of unavailability of trend reports. Consequently, the sample size of 
10 listed Oil and Gas firms in Nigeria is selected, which includes 11 Plc, Conoil Plc, Capital Oil Plc, Eterna 
Plc, Forte Oil Plc, Japaul Oil and Maritime Services Plc, MRS Oil Nigeria Plc, Oando Plc, Seplat Petroleum 
Development Company Plc and Total Nigeria Plc. Data is obtained from the annual reports and accounts of 
the sampled firms for a 5-year period from 2013 to 2017. This is because the IR Framework, which is the 
basis for the determination of Disclosure Index of the firms was introduced in 2013 by the IIRC. 
The dependent variable (integrated reporting) is measured, via content elements of the IR framework, using 
the disclosure score (IRDSCORE). The IRDSCORE is determined as follows: 
IRDSCORE =∑(i=1)(^m)di / ∑(i=1)(^n)di ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------(1) 
Where:  di = 1 if the item in the framework is disclosed;  
  di = 0 if the item is not disclosed; 
  m = number of disclosed items; and 
  n = maximum number of analyzed items. 
The independent variable (board attributes) is measured in terms of the independence (measured by the 
proportion of non-executive to total number of directors) [BINDEP], diligence (measured in terms of 
number of meetings held by the board during the period) [BDILIG], and size (proxied by the natural 
logarithm of the total number of members on the board) [BSIZE] of the board. In addition, the tangibility of 
the firms (proxied by the proportion of non-current assets to total assets) [FTANG], is included as control 
variables to take care of individual firm differences. The regression model for the study is stated as: 
Yit = α + β0Xit + ɛit ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------(1) 
where:  Yit  = Dependent variable of firm ì for time period t;   
= f (IRDSCORE).  
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α  = Constant/Intercept. 
β0  = Coefficient of Independent/Explanatory variables.  
Xit  = Explanatory variables of firm ì for time period t;  
= f (BINDEP, BDILIG, BSIZE, FTANG).  
ɛit  = Error term of firm ì for time period t.  
IRDSCOREit = β0 + β1BINDEPit + β2BDILIGit + β3BSIZEit + β4FTANGit + εit --------------------------------(2) 
The data normality test, heteroscedasticity test, and the multicollinearity test are conducted to ascertain the 
fitness of the data on the model. Moreover, the a priori expectation of the study is stated as β1 ˃ 0; β2 ˃ 0; β3 
˃ 0; and β4 ˃ 0. 
Results and Discussion 
This section presents and discusses the results of the study. It begins with descriptive statistics, followed by 
correlation coefficients and diagnostic tests. In addition, the result of the regression analysis between 
IRDSCORE and BINDEP, BDILIG, BSIZE, and FTANG have been presented and discussed, which forms 
the basis on which the null hypotheses formulated are tested. 
Descriptive Statistics 
The result of the descriptive statistics of the variables of the study is presented in Table 1. It presents a 
summary of the descriptive statistics of the variables of the study. Particularly, the mean, standard deviation, 
minimum and maximum values of all the variables are provided. In addition, the skewness of the variables is 
displayed. 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum Skewness Observations 
IRDSCORE 0.5905091 0.1122242 0.3636364 0.88 0.3670606 50 
BINDEP 0.640145 0.1174063 0.4 0.8181818 -0.316909 50 
BDILIG  4.74 1.046081 3.0 8.0 1.075193 50 
BSIZE 8.34 2.27327 4.0 12.0 -0.2584 50 
FTANG 0.4192488 0.2341942 0.0596997 0.9719344 0.3748708 50 
Source: STATA 13.0 Output, 2018. 
Table 1 reveals that IRDSCORE ranged from 36.4% to 88% with a mean of 59.1% and a standard deviation 
of 11.2%. This implies that the sampled oil and gas firms disclose, on the average, 59.1% of integrated issues 
as indicated on the IR framework and the data deviates from both sides of the mean by 7.4%. Moreover, 
IRDSCORE is positively skewed at 36.7%, meaning that most of the data for IRDSCORE during the study 
period fall on the right-hand side of the normal curve. The data for BINDEP of the sampled oil and gas firms 
has an average of 64%, meaning that the proportion of non-executive directors of the firms is more as 
compared with executive directors. On the other hand, BINDEP deviates from both sides of the mean at the 
rate of 11.7%, has the minimum and maximum values of 40% and 81.8% respectively, resulting to a 41.8% 
range of the data. Similarly, BINDEP is negatively skewed at 31.7%, indicating that most of the data values 
for BINDEP fall on the left-hand side of the normal curve. In addition, the data for BDILIG reports the 
average of 4.74 implying that the board of directors of the sampled firms held an average of about 5 meetings 
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annually. Data for BDILIG deviates from both sides of its average by about 1 meeting. The minimum and 
maximum values of BDILID are about 3 and 8 meetings respectively, yielding the range of 5 meetings. 
Moreover, data for BDILIG is positively skewed at the coefficient of about 1.08, indicating that most of the 
data fall on the right-hand side of the normal distribution curve. 
In addition, data for BSIZE reports an average of 8.34, which means that the size of the board of directors of 
the sampled firms averages about 8 members. BSIZE also shows that the deviation of a number of members 
from both sides of the average number is about 2 members. BSIZE has a range of 8 members, resulting from 
the minimum and maximum values of 4 and 12 members respectively. However, BSIZE is negatively skewed 
at the coefficient of about -0.26, meaning that most of the data for BSIZE fall on the left-hand side of the 
normal distribution curve. Similarly, FTANG reports the mean of about 41.9% and the standard deviation of 
about 23.4%. This indicates that data for FTANG of the sampled listed oil and gas companies deviate from 
both sides of the mean by 23.4%. The data for FTANG has the minimum and maximum values at 5.97% and 
97.2% respectively, resulting in a range of 91.23%. This indicates that the sampled firms are invariably 
tangible. However, FTANG has a positive skewness coefficient of about 0.375, which shows that most of the 
data for FTANG fall on the right-hand side of the normal distribution curve.  
From the foregoing, it can be deduced that the range of data for both the dependent and independent 
variables are wide, indicating the extent of individual firm differences. This justifies the inclusion of firm 
tangibility in the model. In addition, the standard deviation indicates that the data for integrated disclosures 
and board attributes are not widespread across their mean since all standard deviations are less than the 
acceptable level of 2. This implies the similarity in the kinds of integrated disclosures reported by the sampled 
listed oil and gas firms. 
Transformation of Data 
Prior to the descriptive statistics, the measurements of the variables of the study were in diverse units of 
measurement cutting across percentages, number of meetings, and the number of members on the board. 
This requires a transformation of data to ensure uniformity in measurement. Thus, the natural logarithm is 
applied to all variables to facilitate regression analysis, resulting in a transformed model stated as follows: 
Lg.IRDSCOREit = β0 + β1Lg.BINDEPit + β2Lg.BDILIGit + β3Lg.BSIZEit + β4Lg.FTANGit + εit ------------(3) 
Correlation Coefficients  
Table 2: Correlation Matrix 
Variables IRDSCORE BINDEP BDILIG BSIZE FTANG 
IRDSCORE 1.0000     
p-value      
BINDEP 0.0639 1.0000    
p-value 0.6592     
BDILIG  0.1391 0.3796 1.0000   
p-value 0.3355 0.0065    
BSIZE 0.1972 0.1660 0.4987 1.0000  
p-value 0.1698 0.2493 0.0002   
FTANG 0.2958 -0.3917 -0.4616 -0.4040 1.0000 
p-value 0.0370 0.0049 0.0007 0.0036  
Source: STATA 13.0 Output, 2018. 
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This section contains the result of the Pearson pairwise correlation between integrated disclosures proxied by 
the disclosure index (IRDSCORE) and board attributes, measured in terms of board independence 
(BINDEP), board diligence (BDILIG), and board size (BSIZE) with firm tangibility (FTANG) as control the 
variable. The correlation coefficients and levels of significance are presented in Table 2. 
Table 2 shows that there is a positive correlation between IRDSCORE and BINDEP, BDILIG, and BSIZE 
of the sampled listed oil and gas companies in Nigeria at the correlation coefficients of 0.0639, 0.1391, and 
0.1972, which are insignificant at 65.92%, 33.55% and 16.98% levels of significance respectively. Moreover, 
IRDSCORE and FTANG have a positive and significant correlation at the coefficient of 0.2958 and 3.70% 
level of significance. This implies that the degree of integrated disclosure has a direct relationship with board 
attributes.  
Diagnostic Tests 
The study conducts the Shapiro-Wilk test for data normality and the variance inflation factor (VIF) to check 
for multicollinearity among explanatory variables of the study. The results of diagnostic tests are presented in 
Table 3. 
Table 3: Result of Diagnostic Tests 
Variables Data Normality Test Variance Inflation Factor 
 Obs. W V Z P-Value VIF 1/VIF 
IRDSCORE 50 0.98861 0.536 -1.331 0.9084   
BINDEP 50 0.92946 3.318 2.558 0.0053 1.27 0.789227 
BDILIG  50 0.9517 2.271 1.75 0.0401 1.6 0.625093 
BSIZE 50 0.93183 3.206 2.485 0.0065 1.42 0.706586 
FTANG 50 0.95057 2.325 1.799 0.036 1.45 0.689114 
      Mean VIF = 1.43 
Source: STATA 13.0 Output, 2018. 
Test for Data Normality 
The Shapiro-Wilk test is conducted to test the null hypothesis that data for the study is abnormally distributed 
at a 5% level of significance. The decision rule is that the z-statistic with a significant p-value shows 
abnormality while insignificant p-values indicate normality of data. Table 3 shows the z-statistic in respect of 
IRDSCORE, BINDEP, BDILIG, BSIZE, and FTANG at the coefficients of -1.331, 2.558, 1.750, 2.485, and 
1.799 respectively. The result shows a 0.53%, 4.01%, 0.65%, and 3.60% levels of significance respectively in 
respect of data for the explanatory variables, which indicates that data for all measures of board attributes are 
abnormally distributed. This implies that there are high variations in board independence, board diligence, the 
board size, as well as tangibility of listed Oil and Gas firms in Nigeria. These abnormalities require a more 
generalized and robust approach to determining the relationship between integrated disclosures and the 
composition of the board. However, data for IRDSCORE shows a 90.84% level of significance, indicating 
normality of data. 
Test for Multicollinearity 
In addition, the variance inflation factor (VIF) is conducted to test the multicollinearity among explanatory 
variables. The decision rule is that the VIF should not be greater than 5 and the tolerance level should not be 
less than 10%. Table 3 reports the VIF in respect of BINDEP, BDILIG, BSIZE, and FTANG as 1.27, 1.60, 
1.42, and 1.45 with the tolerance levels of about 78.9%, 62.5%, 70.7%, and 68.9% respectively. Moreover, the 
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mean VIF is reported as 1.43. Since the VIFs of the explanatory variables are less than 5 and their tolerance 
levels are greater than 10%, the study accepts that there is the absence of perfect multicollinearity among the 
explanatory variables of the study. 
Regression Result 
Moreover, the study further conducts the post regression heteroscedasticity test to test the null hypothesis 
that there is an absence of heteroscedasticity among variables of the study at a 5% level of significance. As a 
result of the abnormality of data for BINDEP, BDILIG, BSIZE, and FTANG, which suggests that the 
generalized least square (GLS) is more appropriate in establishing the relationship between the dependent and 
independent variables, the Hausman specification test is conducted to determine the suitability between fixed 
and random regression. Given that the outcome of the specification test suggests the random effect, the 
Breusch and Pagan Langragian multiplier test for the random effect is conducted to choose between the 
random effect and robust ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis. The decision rule is to adopt GLS 
random effect regression if the random effect test is significant; while an insignificant random effect means 
the robust OLS regression is adopted. The results of the heteroscedasticity, Hausman specification and 
random effect tests as well as the random effect regression for the fitted values of IRDSCORE is presented in 
Table 4, in which the reports the coefficients of the explanatory variables in the model, their levels of 
significance, R2, as well as the Wald Chi2 and its p-value. 
Table 4: Result of Regression for Fitted Values of IRDSCORE 
Variables Coefficient Z P-Value 
IRDSCORE 1.235307 30.52 0.0000 
BINDEP 0.1976437 2.88 0.0040 
BDILIG  0.1925499 1.68 0.1040 
BSIZE 0.0932056 2.65 0.0080 
FTANG 0.183438 4.03 0.0000 
Hettest Chi2 0.06  0.8077 
Hausman Specification Chi2 0.71  0.9498 
Random Effect Chi2 16.21  0.0000 
R2:  Within 0.1992   
       Between 0.2789   
       Overall 0.2436   
Wald Chi2 302.77  0.0000 
Source: STATA 13.0 Output, 2018. 
Based on the result in Table 4, the model of the study is represented as IRDSCOREit = 1.235307 + 
0.1976437BINDEPi, t + 0.1925499BDILIGi, t + 0.0932056BSIZEi, t + 0.183438FTANGi, t + εit. This 
shows that BINDEP, BDILIG, BSIZE, and FTANG have a positive effect on IRDSCORE respectively, 
which agrees with the a priori expectation of the study. Moreover, the result shows that the coefficients of 
BINDEP, BSIZE, and FTANG are significant at less than 5% level of significance as explained by the p-
values of 0.004, 0.008 and 0.000 respectively. However, the coefficients of BDILIG is insignificant at 5% 
level of significance at the p-value of 0.104. Logically, these findings imply that the more independent and 
diligent the board of directors of the sampled firms are and the higher the size of the boards, the higher the 
volume of integrated disclosures. In addition, as the tangibility of the firms improves, the higher the volume 
of integrated disclosures. The overall result shows that the explanatory variables explain 24.36% of variations 
in the dependent variable (IRDSCORE) as evidenced by the R2 overall of 0.2436, while the remaining 
75.64% is explained by other factors not included in the model of the study.  
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Hypotheses Analysis 
This section presents how the formulated hypotheses are tested. It is based on the regression result presented 
in Table 4. 
Ho1: Board independence has no significant effect on the quality of integrated reporting of listed Oil and 
Gas firms in Nigeria. 
The regression result presented in Table 4 shows that BINDEP explains about 19.76% of variations in 
IRDSCORE at 0.4% level of significance. This shows that BINDEP is significantly and positively associated 
with the quality of integrated disclosure (IRDSCORE) at 5% level of significance. This indicates that board 
independence influences the quality of the integrated disclosure of listed oil and gas firms in Nigeria. 
Consequently, the study rejects the null hypothesis and accepts the alternative hypothesis (Ha1) that board 
independence has a significant effect on the quality of the integrated disclosures of listed oil and gas 
companies in Nigeria. This finding is in agreement with that of Brammer and Pavelin (2008) who also found a 
significant relationship between the proportion of non-executive directors and corporate voluntary 
disclosures. Moreover, this finding contradicts that of Hurghis (2017), who found that the presence of non-
executive directors on the board does not influence the extent to which firms issued integrated report is in 
accordance with the IIR framework.  
Ho2: Board diligence has no significant effect on the quality of integrated reporting of listed Oil and Gas 
firms in Nigeria. 
Based on the result shown in Table 4, BDILIG has an insignificant and positive relationship with the quality 
of integrated disclosures (IRDSCORE) at 5% level of significance given the p-value of 0.104 (10.4%). This 
implies that board diligence affects the quality of integrated disclosures of listed oil and gas firms in Nigeria 
insignificantly but positively. Thus, this result provides evidence for the study to reject the alternative 
hypothesis and accept the null hypothesis (Ho2) that board diligence has no significant effect on the quality of 
integrated reporting of listed oil and gas firms in Nigeria. 
Ho3: Board size has no significant effect on the quality of integrated reporting of listed Oil and Gas firms 
in Nigeria. 
Table 4 shows that BSIZE significantly and positively affects the quality of integrated disclosure 
(IRDSCORE) at 5% level of significance shown by the p-value of 0.008. This indicates that board size 
influences the quality of the integrated disclosure of listed oil and gas firms in Nigeria. Consequently, the 
study rejects the null hypothesis and accepts the alternative hypothesis (Ha3) that board size has a significant 
effect on the quality of the integrated disclosure of listed oil and gas companies in Nigeria. This finding is in 
agreement with that of Hurghis (2017), who also found a direct but weak correlation between board size and 
the disclosure index for integrated reporting. 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
This study examines the relationship between board attributes (independence, diligence, and size) and the 
quality of integrated disclosures of listed oil and gas firms in Nigeria, based on the IIRC integrated reporting 
framework. Based on the regression result, the study found that board independence and board size have a 
significant and positive effect on the quality of integrated disclosures of the sampled firms; while board 
diligence has an insignificant and positive effect on the extent of integrated disclosures of the firms using the 
IIRC integrated reporting framework. These findings agree with the a priori expectation of the study. Sequel 
to these findings, integrated reporting should not be a voluntary disclosure due to its remarkable role in 
developing integrated thinking, improving the quality of information disclosed to shareholders, thus leading 
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to a more efficient and productive allocation of capital. In addition, integrated reporting is intended to 
become the norm in corporate reporting.  
On the basis of the findings, the study concludes that the composition of the board of directors of listed oil 
and gas firms in Nigeria to comprise the optimum mix of members have a significant effect on the quality of 
integrated disclosures of the firms. This is because the general principle of corporate governance requires that 
there should be an optimum balance of individuals on the board with a suitable range of skills, experience, 
and expertise. The optimum mix would ensure power-balance to avoid power-dominance of a selected few 
board members, which make the board to have checks and balances and to work towards protecting the 
interests of all stakeholders.  
Based on the conclusion drawn, the study recommends that the shareholders who are responsible for the 
appointment of members of the board of directors should always consider the information needs of all 
stakeholders and appoint the right and qualified persons that would drive corporate reporting to be more 
integrative, considering the fact that integrated reporting is still a voluntary disclosure in Nigeria. This is 
because it is becoming increasingly important for companies to integrate financial statements, management 
commentary, governance issues, environmental concerns and remuneration matters in their business 
strategies and reporting. Consequently, it is important for the board of directors of listed oil and gas firms in 
Nigeria to ensure that corporate activities in these areas are adequately communicated to all stakeholders. By 
so doing, the information asymmetry between the management of listed oil and gas firms and their 
stakeholders would be curtailed. In addition, regulatory agencies such as the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, the Financial Reporting Council of Nigeria, and other relevant agencies should strengthen and 
enforce mandatory disclosure guidelines in the direction of corporate integrated reports, especially in the 
development of their corporate governance codes for firms. These measures would compel the boards of 
directors to improve their corporate disclosure role to stakeholders. 
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APPENDIX A 
POPULATION OF THE STUDY 
S/N Firm Year of Listing Nature of Business 
1 11 Plc (Mobil 
Nigeria Plc) 
1991 Marketing of Petroleum Products; Manufacturing of 
Automotive/Industrial Lubricants and Petroleum Jelly. 
 
2 Anino 
International Plc 
 
1990 
 
Manufacturing of Pins, Staples, and Paper Clips, Nails and 
Commercial Electroplating. 
 
3 Capital Oil Plc 
 
1989 
 
Marketing of Petroleum Products. 
 
4 Conoil Plc 
 
1989 
 
Marketing of Refined Petroleum Products; Manufacturing 
and Marketing of Lubricants. 
 
5 Eterna Plc 
 
1998 
 
Manufacturing and Marketing of Lubricating Oils and Petro-
Chemicals; Sale of Fuels. 
 
6 Forte Oil Plc 
 
1978 
 
Exploration, Production, and Marketing of Petroleum 
Products. 
 
7 Japaul Oil and 
Maritime Services 
Plc 
 
2005 
 
Rendering of Maritime Services; Oil and Gas Services; 
Dredging; Quarry; Transportation, Engineering, and 
Construction. 
 
8 MRS Oil Nigeria 
Plc 
 
1978 
 
Marketing and Distribution of Refined Petroleum Products; 
Blending of Lubricants; and Manufacture of Greases. 
 
9 Oando Plc 
 
1992 
 
Exploration, Production, and Refining of Petroleum Products; 
Energy Services; Gas and Power; and Marketing, Supply, and 
Trading of Petroleum Products. 
 
10 Rak Unity Pet. 
Company Plc 
 
1987 
 
Marketing of Petroleum Products. 
 
11 Seplat Pet. Dev. 
Company Plc 
 
2014 
 
Exploration and Production of Petroleum Products. 
 
12 Total Nigeria Plc 
 
1978 
 
Exploration and Production of Petroleum Products; 
Marketing of Petroleum Products. 
 
Source: http://nse.com.ng/issuers/listed-securities/listed-companies, 2018. 
 
